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This dissertation first seeks to understand what "moral intuitions" are, and what role 
they play, in three prominent ethics papers: (1) Philippa Foot's "The Problem of 
Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect", (2) Judith Jarvis Thomson's "The Trolley 
Problem", and (3) Frances Kamm's "Harming Some to Save Others". 
 
These papers have been selected because they are often cited as examples of 
philosophical work which make extensive use of moral intuitions. The papers also 
form a continuous and sustained discussion about the same ethical issues.  
 
Subsequently, this dissertation considers Daniel Kahneman's empirical findings in 
psychology and behavioural economics, about the systematic errors that beset 
intuitive judgements. In light of those findings, the dissertation attempts to unpack 
concerns about the kind of extensive intuition use found in Foot, Thomson, and 
Kamm's papers. 
 
Finally, this dissertation makes some small suggestions about what role moral 
















0.1 My Project 
 
In the course of studying papers and books written by moral philosophers, I have 
noticed that things referred to as "moral intuitions" -- whether explicitly labelled as 
such by their writers, or by commentators -- are sometimes used at crucial junctures 
in constructing and critiquing ethical arguments, as well as in modifying those 
arguments in response to criticism. 
 
At the same time, I am also aware that there is a rich body of empirical research on 
decision-making. This research studies the "intuitive judgements" that people make, 
and one big learning point coming out from that research is that people’s intuitive 
judgements are very much affected by various cognitive biases. As a result, when 
people make intuitive judgements, those judgements tend to be prone to error. 
 
In light of this research about intuitive judgements, when I consider the use of moral 
intuitions in moral philosophy, I am compelled to ask the following questions: 
 
 My questions 
 
(1) Are "moral intuitions" included amongst the "intuitive judgements" studied 
by the empirical research on decision-making? In other words, do the 
empirical findings about intuitive judgements being prone to error apply to 
moral intuitions? 
 
(2) If the empirical findings do apply to moral intuitions, then what are the 
implications of using moral intuitions in moral philosophy? What role, if 




In this thesis, I attempt to answer these questions in several steps: 
 
 Steps in the thesis 
  
In Chapter 1, I clarify what a "moral intuition" might mean, by looking at the 
various pre-existing definitions of "intuition" in the philosophical literature. 
Here, I take my bearings from Herman Cappelen's 2012 book, Philosophy 
Without Intuitions, which contains a taxonomy of the various possible 
definitions of "intuition".  
 
Because it is possible to define "intuition" in a large number of ways, I choose 
to narrow down the scope of my thesis by focusing on moral intuitions as they 
are characterised, and as they are used, in three prominent ethics papers – 
namely, Philippa Foot's "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of 
Double Effect", Judith Jarvis Thomson's "The Trolley Problem", and 
Frances Kamm's "Harming Some to Save Others". I have chosen these 
particular papers because they form a continuous discussion on more or less 
the same ethical issues, and they are often cited as philosophical works that 
make heavy use of moral intuitions. 
 
In Chapter 2, I take a closer look at Foot, Thomson, and Kamm's papers, in 
order to understand their projects and the exact role that moral intuitions play 
in their work. 
 
In Chapter 3, I lay out Kamm's explanation of how her philosophical method – 
the method that is shared by Foot and Thomson – works, including her 
significant use of moral intuitions. Here, I take my bearings from Alex 
Voorhoeve's 2009 book of interviews, Conversations on Ethics, in which 
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he interviews Frances Kamm, and engages her directly on her views about 
intuition use. 
 
In Chapter 4, I consider another interview conducted by Voorhoeve. This time 
round, Voorhoeve interviews Daniel Kahneman, the Nobel Prize-winning 
psychologist and behavioural economist who studies how people form 
judgements and make decisions. This interview is instructive, because 
Voorhoeve pits Kahneman's empirical findings about the systematic errors 
that beset intuitive judgements directly against Kamm's extensive intuition 
use. Kahneman, with his reservations about trusting intuitive judgements, is 
asked to comment on Kamm's intuition use. Here, I delve into Daniel 
Kahneman's 2011 book, Thinking, fast and slow, which gives a 
comprehensive overview and explanation of his research findings, and I pay 
particular attention to several sorts of systematic errors pertaining to intuitive 
judgements, that I think are especially relevant to Foot, Thomson, and 
Kamm's brand of intuition use. 
 
Finally, in Chapter Five, I make some small suggestions about what role 
moral intuitions could play in moral philosophy, in light of the concerns about 
intuition use that I have laid out in the preceding chapters. 
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WHAT IS A "MORAL INTUITION"? 
 
1.1 Pre-existing Definitions of "Intuition" in the Literature 
 
When I survey the pre-existing literature on intuition use in philosophy, it becomes 
clear to me that there is disagreement among philosophers about how to best define, 
or characterise, what an "intuition" is. 
 
In Philosophy Without Intuitions (2012), Herman Cappelen provides a helpful 
taxonomy of the various definitions of "intuition" and cognate terms like "intuitive" and 
"intuitively", that have accrued over the years. Cappelen tracks both the everyday, 
non-technical meanings of "intuition", as well as its more technical meanings, 
meanings that philosophers have associated with it. 
 
Here are some of the things that "intuition", "intuitive", and "intuitively" could mean: 
 





• If a thing is "intuitive", then it has a certain effortlessness and spontaneity 
about it 
• eg. an intuitive operating system 
 
• If a proposition or judgement is "intuitive", then it is already "in the 
common ground" – in other words, it is something which is generally 
known, recognised, or understood by people 
• eg. the intuitive thing to do 
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• Sometimes, an "intuitive" judgement is also understood as a "pre-
theoretic" judgement: "a conclusion reached prior to or independently of 
an investigation of the question under discussion" 
 
• If a claim is prefaced by "intuitively" -- as in Intuitively, p -- then this 
serves to qualify the strength of the speaker's commitment to the claim. 
For instance, it serves to signal that the speaker is putting forth a 
judgement or presenting an understanding which was reached "with 
relatively little reflection or reasoning". 
 
 
Technical (philosophical) characterisations 
 
• "Intuition" refers to a mental state which is reducible to a belief (or 
inclinations to believe). 
 
• "Intuition" may refer to a belief which is accompanied by a special feel or 
phenomenology. 
 
• "Intuition" may refer to a belief which is justified by default, which 
"serve[s] as a kind of rock bottom justificatory point in philosophical 
argumentation", helping to justify other claims and beliefs, but not itself 
needing justification. This would be a belief that is "treated as justified 
even though appeals to experience (memory, perception) play no clear 
evidential role" in supporting it. It is "not inferred from other premises". 
And it is a belief that the believer is not inclined to disbelieve even when it 




Source: (Cappelen 2012: 9, 10, 62, 112, 113) 
 
 
As can be seen from Cappelen's taxonomy, "intuition" and its cognate terms can thus 
be characterised in different ways. And there is no single characterisation that all 
philosophers are agreeable to.  
 
I choose to deal with this lack of consensus by focusing the scope of my thesis 




• "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect" (1967) by 
Philippa Foot,  
• "The Trolley Problem" (1985) by Judith Jarvis Thomson,  
• and "Harming Some to Save Others" (1989) by Frances Kamm. 
 
 
For easy reference, I shall henceforth refer to these papers as the Three Papers. 
 
I have chosen to focus on the Three Papers because they form a rather natural 
grouping: 
 
Reasons for choosing the Three Papers 
 




(2) "Intuition" appears to have the same characterisation in these papers, and 
it also appears to play the same role. 
 
(3) The Three Papers are part of the same, neatly self-contained, 
philosophical conversation: Foot 1967 kicks off a debate which Thomson 
1985 responds to, and Kamm 1989 is in turn a reply to Thomson 1985. 
 
 
Any conclusions about intuition use that I arrive at during the course of writing this 
thesis would thus be modest in this sense: they would apply to those philosophical 
projects which characterise and use "intuitions" in more or less the same way as the 
Three Papers do.  
 
I do not presume to comment on other, markedly different kinds of intuition use in 
other areas of philosophy. 
 
 
1.2 What Characteristics Does "Intuition" Have in the Three Papers?  
 
"Intuition" in the Three Papers exhibits the following characteristics. 
 
First and foremost, "intuition" in these texts refers to a case judgement1. This means 
that "intuition" here refers to a judgement about the moral (im)permissibility of some 
action in a particular case or situation.  
 
In each of the Three Papers, the philosopher first describes ethically challenging 
situations — be it real-life or hypothetical ones — and she then states her judgement 
																																								 																				
1 This nametag itself, case judgement, is a convenient shorthand to refer to 
judgements about particular cases, and I encountered it while reading Alex 
Voorhoeve's Conversations On Ethics (2009). I have borrowed the nametag for this 
thesis. 
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about the (im)permissibility of the various courses of action which are available to an 
agent in that situation. Foot, Thomson, and Kamm all come up with many case 
judgements.  
 
Secondly, these case judgements are also non-inferred judgements -- that is to say, 
they are not conclusions inferred from a prior series of premises. 
 
I know the case judgements are non-inferred judgements because Foot, Thomson, 
and Kamm present their case judgements right after they present the details of the 
cases/situations themselves. The philosophers do not lay out an intervening line of 
reasoning, or process of argumentation, between the time they first present the case 
details and the time they present their case judgements. There is no intervening line 
of reasoning. 
 
In fact, Foot, Thomson, and Kamm spend the bulk of their papers trying to find an 
underlying principle that could plausibly explicate their various case judgements. If 
the case judgements had been the products of arguments and chains of reasoning, 
presumably the philosophers would already have had some idea about which 
principles could or could not explicate their case judgements. After all, a case 
judgement which is supported — justified — by preceding premises would, in a sense, 
have also been explicated: it would have been shown to logically follow from a certain 
principle, when that principle is taken together with the particular facts surrounding 
the case/situation at hand.  
 
In the Three Papers, however, the philosophers start out with case judgements that 
they simply form, without any such explication. They form 'conclusions', as it were, 
about which courses of action are permissible in various ethically challenging cases, 
without arriving at those 'conclusions' via a step-by-step process of reasoning.  
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The case judgements are formed first, and the attempt to construct a chain of 
reasoning that explicates them comes afterwards, after the case judgements have 
been formed. 
 
Thirdly, in an interview with Alex Voorhoeve for his book, Conversations on Ethics 
(2009), Kamm describes her case judgements as being "considered" judgements. 
She gives Voorhoeve some idea of what it might mean for a judgement to be a 
"considered" one: 
 
FRANCES KAMM: ... I don't really have a considered judgement about a 
case until I have a visual experience of it. I have to deeply imagine myself 
in a certain situation, with an open mind. It is almost as if you are 
looking at something with no preconceptions. You have to attend to it, 
and then things will pop out at you. First you may get the intuitive 
judgement of what you really should do in the circumstance you are 
imagining. Then you wonder, 'Why am I reaching this conclusion?' And your 
inner eye focuses on one factor as driving this judgement. I suppose that it 
is the same sort of thing when you look at a painting. Make sure you are 
attending to it and aren't having stray thoughts. You start to focus on 
what is so fascinating about it. And it can take a while. You can develop 
a whole theory about what is causing you to have an aesthetic 
judgement, and the same can be said about judgements in moral cases. 
[my emphases] 
 
Source: (Voorhoeve 2009: 22) 
 
 
The sense I get from Kamm here is that her case judgements are "considered" in the 
sense that she forms a judgement after giving a case her undivided attention — after 
being fully present, as it were, and attending to the case with care. The opposite of a 
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considered judgement would perhaps be a judgement that a person forms in haste, 
while being in a scattered, multi-tasking state of mind. 
 
As I do close readings of the Three Papers, I notice a few further characteristics of 
"intuition" in their projects.  
 
I notice that all three philosophers take their "intuitions" seriously: all three use 
their "intuitions" as the starting points in their ethical inquiry. (What it means to use 
"intuitions" as starting points will become clear in Chapter 2 of this thesis, when I go 
through the Three Papers in more detail.) 
 
I notice also that all three philosophers believe their "intuitions" are shared by 
other people.  
 
Here, then, is a preliminary summary of the characteristics of "intuition" in the Three 
Papers: 
 
Characterisation of "Intuition" in the Three Papers 
 
In the Three Papers, an "intuition" is: 
 
• a "case" judgement 
§ a judgement about the moral (im)permissibility of some 
action in a particular situation/case 
• a non-inferred judgement 
§ a judgement which is not a conclusion inferred from a prior 
series of premises 
• a "considered" judgement 
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§ a judgement formed after giving a case one's undivided 
attention, and being fully present and attending to the case 
with care 
• a judgement that is taken seriously 
• a judgement that is used as a starting point in ethical inquiry 
• and it is a judgement that is either (i) believed by the philosopher 
to be already shared by other people, or (ii) believed by the 




Now that I have laid out what "intuition" is in the Three Papers, I will go on to 
introduce the projects that Foot, Thomson and Kamm are engaged in, in those 
papers. I seek to understand what exactly it is these philosophers are trying to do with 




CHAPTER 2:  
READING THREE PAPERS: FOOT 1967, THOMSON 1985, KAMM 1989 
 
 
2.1 Foot, Thomson, and Kamm's projects 
 
In this chapter, I introduce the projects that Foot, Thomson, and Kamm are engaged 
in, in the Three Papers. 
 





Foot says (or implies) the following in "The Problem of Abortion and the 
Doctrine of Double Effect" (1967): 
 
• I want to know if abortion is permissible under a certain set of 
circumstances. This is what I want to find out. 
• My overall strategy is to proceed from cases in which I am sure what 
the morally right thing to do is, to cases where I have no such 
certainty. 
• And so I carry out my philosophical inquiry using three broad steps. 
• Step 1:  
o First, I find cases that are structurally similar to the abortion 
cases I am interested in. These structurally similar cases are 
ones about which I have formed case judgements -- 
judgements about what the morally right thing to do is, in 
those cases. These judgements are not inferred from any 
	 19	
prior premises. Moreover, these are case judgements that I 
feel certain about. Let's call these cases "clear cases". 
• Step 2:  
o After that, I find a principle that can explicate my case 
judgements about the "clear cases". 
• Step 3:  
o Finally, I take the principle I have found, and I apply it to the 
original abortion cases, the cases where I was unsure what 
the morally right thing to do might be. 
 
• In this sense, I use my case judgements as starting points in my 
ethical inquiry. And I treat them as fixed points to be explicated by 
some suitable principle. 
• For me, a principle distills the essence of my case judgements. A 
principle is a thread that holds together my judgements about 
particular situations.  
• For me, a principle is also the thing I use to forge a connection 
between the things I believe I already know (the things I feel certain 
about), to the things I do not yet know (the things I feel unsure 
about). 
• I take my case judgements seriously. 
• I believe that my case judgements are shared by other people. 
• At the same time, I want to make sure that when I form new moral 
beliefs, they should ideally be in line with my pre-existing moral 









Thomson says (or implies) the following in "The Trolley Problem" (1985):  
• I want to extend Foot's project. 
• I share Foot's case judgements (I have formed the same case 
judgements that she has).  
• But I have additional case judgements about other cases -- cases 
which are also structurally similar to abortion -- but which Foot did not 
bring up. 
• I dislike the principle Foot came up with, because I believe it does not 
explicate my additional case judgements. 
• I have come up with a better principle, which I believe explicates both 
Foot's case judgements as well as my additional ones. 
• Like Foot, I take my case judgements seriously. 
• Like Foot, I believe that my additional case judgements are shared by 
other people. 
• Like Foot, I use my case judgements as starting points in my ethical 
inquiry. And I treat them as fixed points to be explicated by a suitable 
principle. 
• When I form new case judgements, and I find that a pre-existing 
principle cannot explicate them, I choose to modify or discard the 





Kamm says (or implies) the following in "Harming Some to Save 
Others" (1989): 
 
• I want to extend Foot and Thomson's projects. 
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• I share Foot and Thomson's case judgements (I have formed the 
same case judgements that they have). 
• But I have case judgements about many other cases that are also 
structurally similar to abortion. These further cases were not brought 
up by either Foot or Thomson. 
• I dislike the principle Thomson came up with, because it does not 
explicate my further case judgements.  
• I have an even better principle that explicates so many more 
judgements about cases that are structurally similar to abortion. 
• Like Foot and Thomson, I take my case judgements seriously. 
• I believe other people should share my case judgements. 
• However, I also want to check if my principle reflects something of 
moral relevance. I want to make sure that the distinctions I perceive 
between cases really are based on something morally relevant. 
• This is my way of checking or verifying my case judgements. 
• For me, a principle distills the essence of my case judgements. A 
principle is a thread that holds together my judgements about 
particular situations. 
• So, if I discover that the principle I favour -- the principle which 
explicates my case judgements -- does not actually reflect something 
of moral relevance, I take this as a sign that I need to reconsider my 
case judgements and, if need be, to revise them. 
 
 
The above "I"-statements capture my overall understanding of what Foot, Thomson 
and Kamm are trying to do in their respective papers.  
 
I find that the three philosophers take very similar approaches in the way they do 
moral philosophy. In particular, moral "intuitions" are taken seriously by all three 
philosophers, and also appear to play similar roles in their papers. There are still 
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differences between the three philosophers, but those differences revolve around 
them favouring different principles with different explicatory powers. The philosophers' 
overall approach to moral philosophy remains largely the same. 
 
For ease of reference, I shall refer to the way in which Foot, Thomson and Kamm use 
moral intuitions in their papers as FTK's way of using moral intuitions or FTK's 
intuition use.  
 
In summary, FTK's intuition use consists of the following broad moves: 
 
FTK's Intuition Use 
 
First:  
A philosopher starts off being unsure about what the morally right or 
permissible thing to do might be, in a particular situation X. 
 
Second:  
The philosopher considers cases that are structurally similar to X. These are 
cases about which she forms case judgements -- judgements about what the 
morally right or permissible thing to do is. Moreover, she feels certain about 
these case judgements. Call these cases "clear cases". The philosopher's 
judgements about the clear cases are non-inferred -- they are not 
conclusions inferred from prior premises.  
 
Third: 
The philosopher finds a principle that explicates her non-inferred case 




The philosopher applies the principle to the original situation X that she was 
unsure about. Thanks to applying the principle, the philosopher finds out what 
the morally right or permissible thing to do in X is. 
 
 
Having spelled out FTK's intuition use in general terms, let us now take a closer look 
at Foot's 1967 paper. 
 
 
2.2 Reading Foot 1967 
 
In "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect" (1967), Philippa Foot 
is mainly concerned with ethical issues pertaining to abortion. 
 
She observes that there are many different circumstances under which people 
consider carrying out abortions. For instance, in light of serious medical complications 
with a pregnancy, an abortion is sometimes considered. 
 
For Foot, there are a few types of medical circumstances under which she is not sure 
if carrying out an abortion is morally permissible: 
 
Abortion On Medical Grounds 
Foot asks: Is abortion morally permissible in these types of situations? 
 
Situation Type 1 
Mother and child cannot both be saved: 
• the child cannot be saved no matter what 
• but the mother can be saved by killing the child. 
 
Situation Type 2 
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Only one party (either mother or child) can be saved: 
• the mother can be saved and the child killed 
    OR 
• the mother can be killed and the child saved. 
 
Situation Type 3 
• The mother can be saved by killing the child (eg. by crushing its skull) 
    OR 
• Do nothing, in which case the mother will die but the child can be 
safely delivered after her death. 
 
 Source: (Foot 1967: 5) 
 
 
According to Foot, situations of the third type present "the worst dilemma": it is 
unclear what exactly the decision-maker in those situations is morally permitted or not 
permitted to do. Part of Foot's objective in her 1967 paper was precisely to figure out 
what acts/decisions would be permissible in these three types of abortion situations, 
and especially in the third type.  
 
Foot's project, thus, is to address a gap in her knowledge. And she has a strategy for 
doing this. Foot's strategy basically involves taking cues from those situations she is 
sure about.  
 




Step 1:  
Find some situations that are not about abortion, but which are ... 
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• structurally similar to abortion-type cases, 
• and where Foot is sure about what the (im)permissible thing to do is. 
 
Foot refers to these situations as "parallel" and "clear cases", and she claims 
that her case judgements about these situations are shared by other people. 
 
Step 2:  
Come up with a principle that explicates Foot's case judgements about 
these "clear cases". 
By explicates, I mean that this principle, when taken together with the 
particular facts of each "clear" case, will logically entail Foot's case 
judgements. 
 
Step 3:  
Apply the principle to the abortion situations that Foot was originally 
unsure about.  
By apply, I mean that the principle, when taken together with the particular 
facts of the original "unclear" cases, will logically entail case judgements that 
tell Foot whether abortion is permissible in those situations. 
 
 
Seeing Foot's strategy in terms of these steps should make it clear that the strategy is 
predicated on moving from situations and case judgements which Foot is sure about, 
to those about which she is uncertain. The strategy involves moving from what is 
known -- if Foot's case judgements could indeed be considered knowledge -- to what 
is unknown. 
 
At the start of her paper, Foot writes that she wants to set up and discuss 
hypothetical cases which are "parallels" to cases of abortion (Foot 1967: 1).  
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Now, it is important to note that Foot understands abortion as a situation where the 
interests of two parties are in conflict: the mother's and the unborn child's. This is how 
abortion is framed in Foot 1967. The parallel hypothetical situations would thus 
be similar to abortion in one important way: in these cases, the interests of two 
parties are in conflict/competition, just like abortion as Foot understands it. However, 
the hypothetical cases differ from abortion in that they involve "adults and children 
who are already born" (Foot 1967: 1).  
 
The hypothetical cases are specifically crafted to make the one feature they share 
with abortion — clashing interests — extremely stark.  
 
As Foot puts it, the point of having these parallel cases is to "isolate" what she refers 
to as the "equal rights issue", thus "throwing light on" the (im)permissibility of abortion 
(Foot 1967: 1). 
 
Abortion-type situations are thus not the only kind of situation where the interests of 
individuals are in conflict. Foot points out that, in general, "we" are "confused" about 
what acts/decisions are morally permitted or not permitted in cases "where the 
interests of human beings conflict" (Foot 1967: 1). "We" are not just confused about 
abortion specifically.  
 
A note about language: I have placed the pronoun "we" in scarequotes because 
Foot uses "we" quite frequently, but it is not clear to me exactly which group of people 
"we" is supposed to refer to. For instance, "we" could refer to society in general, or 
perhaps to the vast majority of moral philosophers. It is not clear. I have therefore 
chosen to make scarequotes accompany the pronoun "we", as a reminder of its 
ambiguous referent(s) in Foot's paper. 
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At any rate, Foot claims that there are "certain cases" involving competing interests 
where "we" actually have "strong intuitions" about what acts/decisions are 
(im)permissible (Foot 1967: 1).  
 
Foot does not define what she means by "intuitions", or what it might mean for an 
"intuition" to be "strong".  
 
Nevertheless, it can be inferred that what she means to say — at the very least — is 
this: for some cases, "we" are not confused about what acts/decisions are 
(im)permissible. In these so-called clear cases, "we" are sure about which available 
acts/decisions are permissible, and which are not. In this sense, then, a strong 
intuition in Foot's paper refers to a moral judgement that one is certain and clear 
about. 
 
Foot's plan then is to examine these so-called clear cases and to infer a general 
moral principle from them. This would be a principle that accounts for, that explicates, 
"our" judgements of moral (im)permissibility for those clear cases.  
 
As with the meaning of "intuition", Foot does not explicitly elaborate on the exact role 
played by such a principle. She simply writes that "[i]t is not easy ... to see the 
principles involved" (Foot 1967: 1).  
 
Nevertheless, I think it can be inferred that Foot means for such a principle to 
explicate "our" judgements in this sense: the principle, taken together with the 
particular facts of each clear case, would logically entail judgements of 
(im)permissibility. And these judgements would match "our" original judgements 
about the clear cases. 
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Once such a principle has been found, Foot's plan is to then apply it to the so-called 
confusing or 'unclear' cases, cases where "we" are not sure which acts are 
(im)permissible.  
 
The hope is that the principle, taken together with the particular facts of 
each unclear case this time, would logically entail judgements about what's 
(im)permissible to do in those unclear cases. In this way, "we" would thus resolve 
"our" confusion about the unclear cases. 
 
This is the overall strategy in Foot 1967. She takes clear cases and makes them shed 
light on unclear cases. 
 
 
2.3 What are Foot's "clear cases"? 
 
From the picture I have painted of Foot's overall strategy, it should be apparent that 
moral judgements about clear cases play a very important role in the way she carries 
out her philosophical inquiry. 
 
Let's look at what exactly these clear cases might be. 
 
Foot gives multiple examples of clear cases. According to her, one example of a clear 
case would be "kill[ing] the feeble-minded to aid cancer research". For Foot, this act 
is clearly impermissible. She claimed that "we" would judge that "it is not all right to 
kill the feeble-minded to aid cancer research" (Foot 1967: 1).  
 
Other examples of clear cases include hypothetical cases. These cases 
are imagined situations: situations that people could find themselves in as a matter of 
logical possibility, even though it may be quite unlikely that they ever will.  
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What these hypothetical situations have in common is that all of them involve two 
parties with competing interests, parallel to how Foot understands cases of abortion. 
A third party then has to choose which of those competing interests to uphold. 
 
I will present the hypothetical situations in a table below, describing them using Foot's 
own words. The situations come in three pairs. Each situation, Foot claims, generates 
a certain judgement from "us". I will tabulate these allegedly shared judgements right 
next to the corresponding cases. 
 
The important thing to note about the clear, hypothetical cases is that the particular 
details of each case are carefully crafted to make certain things especially stark. As 
Foot puts it, the cases are designed to "isolate" certain things (Foot 1967: 1). These 
cases are certainly not imagined at random, and nor are they simply given. Thus, far 
from being neutral, they are constructed with certain ends already in mind. 
 
After presenting the clear, hypothetical cases and "our" judgements about what is 
(im)permissible to do in each situation, Foot then lays out what one putative 
explicatory principle has to say about "our" judgements.  
 
This principle is the Doctrine of Double Effect, or DDE for short -- a principle that Foot 
goes on to critique in her paper. I will also include what the principle says in the table 
below.  
 




CASE DESCRIPTION "OUR" RESPONSE TO 
THE CASE 





"Suppose that a judge or 
magistrate is faced with rioters 
 
"... most of us would be 




demanding that a culprit be 
found for a certain crime and 
threatening otherwise to take 
their own bloody revenge on a 
particular section of the 
community. The real culprit 
being unknown, the judge sees 
himself as able to prevent the 
bloodshed only by framing 
some innocent person and 
having him executed. ... In the 
case of the riots the mob have 
five hostages, so that ... the 
exchange is supposed to be 
one man's life for the lives of 
five." (Foot 1967: 2) 
 
innocent man could be 
framed ... It may be 
suggested that the special 
feature of [this] case is that it 
involves the corruption of 
justice, and this is, of course, 
very important indeed. But if 
we remove that special 
feature, supposing that some 
private individual is to kill an 
innocent person and pass 
him off as the criminal we 
still find ourselves horrified 




"Beside this example is placed 
another in which a pilot whose 
airplane is about to crash is 
deciding whether to steer from 
a more to a less inhabited 
area. To make the parallel as 
close as possible it may rather 
be supposed that he is the 
driver of a runaway tram which 
he can only steer from one 
narrow track on to another; five 
men are working on one track 
 
"... we should say, without 
hesitation, that the driver 
should steer for the less 
occupied track" (Foot 1967: 
2) 
 
"The [DDE] offers us a way 
out of the difficulty, insisting 
that it is one thing to steer 
towards someone foreseeing 
that you will kill him and 
another to aim at his death 
as part of your plan." (Foot 
1967: 2) 
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and one man on the other; 
anyone on the track he enters 






"We are about to give a patient 
who needs it to save his life a 
massive dose of a certain drug 
in short supply. There arrive, 
however, five other patients 
each of whom could be saved 
by one-fifth of that dose." (Foot 
1967: 3) 
 
"We say with regret that we 
cannot spare our whole 
supply of the drug for a 
single patient, just as we 
should say that we could not 
spare the whole resources of 
a ward for one dangerously 
ill individual when 
ambulances arrive bringing 
in victims of a multiple crash. 
We feel bound to let one 
man die rather than many if 








"... killing people in the 
interests of cancer research or 
to obtain, let us say, spare 
parts for grafting on to those 
who need them ... We can 
suppose, similarly, that several 
dangerously ill people can be 
saved only if we kill a certain 
 
"... we [do] not feel justified 
in killing people in the 
interests of cancer research 
or to obtain, let us say, spare 
parts for grafting on those 
who need them" (Foot 1967: 
3) 
 
"Once again the [DDE] 
comes up with an 
explanation. In one kind of 
case but not the other we 
aim at the death of an 
innocent man." (Foot 1967: 
3) 
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individual and make a serum 














"Suppose for example that 
some tyrant should threaten to 
torture five men if we ourselves 
would not torture one. Would it 
be our duty to do so, supposing 
we believed him, because this 
would be no different from ... 
 
... choosing to rescue five men 
from his torturers rather than 
one?" (Foot 1967: 3) 
 
 
"If [it is our duty to do] so ... 
[then] anyone who wants us 
to do something we think 
wrong has only to threaten 
that otherwise he himself will 
do something we think 
worse ..." (Foot 1967: 3) 
 
"From this conclusion we are 
again rescued by the [DDE]. 
If we refuse, we foresee that 
the greater number will be 
killed but we do not intend it: 
it is he who intends (that is 
strictly or directly intends) 
the death of innocent 




2.4 Observations about Foot's clear, hypothetical cases 
 
The hypothetical cases above, though distinct, are designed to have one striking 
feature in common.  
 
In each case, there is an agent who must decide what to do, and that agent has only 
two alternative actions to choose from. Carrying out one of the actions will (definitely) 
bring about the death of 1 person and preserve the lives of 5 others. Alternatively, 
carrying out the other action will (definitely) bring about the death of 5 persons and 
preserve the life of 1 other.  
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"We" are thus invited to assess the moral permissibility of the two alternative actions 
in each hypothetical case.  
  
For half of the cases (the cases I have labelled 1A, 2A, and 3A), "we" allegedly judge 
it impermissible for the decision-maker to carry out an action that brings about the 
loss of 1 life and preserves 5 others.  
 
However, for the remaining cases (the ones I have labelled 1B, 2B, and 3B), "we" 
allegedly judge it permissible for the decision-maker to carry out an action that brings 
about the same state of affairs: the loss of 1 life and the preservation of 5 others. And 
these judgements of "ours" are alleged to be clear judgements, judgements that "we" 
feel certain about. These are supposed to be clear cases. 
 
At any rate, over time in the philosophical literature, the situation involving the 
"runaway tram" in case 1B became known as the Trolley case, and the situation 
involving the "grafting" of organs in case 2B became known as the Transplant case.  
 
This is where Judith Jarvis Thomson joins the discussion, and responds to Foot. 
 
 
2.5 Reading Thomson 1985 
 
In Judith Jarvis Thomson's 1985 paper, "The Trolley Problem", she furnishes the 
Trolley and Transplant cases with greater descriptive detail.  
 
That said, although the description of the cases is expanded, "our" moral judgements 
about the actions of the decision-maker allegedly remain unchanged in each case: 
 
The Trolley Case 
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"Suppose you are the driver of a trolley. The trolley rounds a bend, and there 
come into view ahead five track workmen, who have been repairing the track. 
The track goes through a bit of a valley at that point, and the sides are steep, 
so you must stop the trolley if you are to avoid running the five men down. 
You step on the brakes, but alas they don't work. Now you suddenly see a 
spur of track leading off to the right. You can turn the trolley onto it, and thus 
save the five men on the straight track ahead. Unfortunately, Mrs. Foot has 
arranged that there is one track workman on that spur of track. He can no 
more get off the track in time than the five can, so you will kill him if you turn 
the trolley onto him. Is it morally permissible for you to turn the trolley? / 
Everybody to whom I have put this hypothetical case says, Yes, it is." 
(Thomson 1985: 1395) [my emphasis] 
 
 
The Transplant Case 
 
"Now consider a second hypothetical case. This time you are to imagine 
yourself to be a surgeon, a truly great surgeon. Among other things you do, 
you transplant organs, and you are such a great surgeon that the organs you 
transplant always take. At the moment you have five patients who need 
organs. Two need one lung each, two need a kidney each, and the fifth 
needs a heart. If they do not get those organs today, they will all die; if you 
find organs for them today, you can transplant the organs and they will all live. 
But where to find the lungs, the kidneys, and the heart? The time is almost up 
when a report is brought to you that a young man who has just come into 
your clinic for his yearly check-up has exactly the right blood-type, and is in 
excellent health. Lo, you have a possible donor. All you need do is cut him up 
and distribute his parts among the five who need them. You ask, but he says, 
"Sorry. I deeply sympathize, but no." Would it be morally permissible for you 
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to operate anyway? / Everybody to whom I have put this second 
hypothetical case says, No, it would not be morally permissible for you 
to proceed." (Thomson 1985: 1396) [my emphasis] 
 
 
Trolley and Transplant thus became more or less representative of the original batch 
of cases, in the sense that they became prime exhibits in the discussion about how to 
resolve the "problem" with "our" judgements.  
 
Indeed, "our" judgements about Trolley and Transplant were considered problematic. 
In the same 1985 paper, after describing Trolley and Transplant, Thomson articulates 
what exactly the "problem" with "our" judgements about the two cases is supposed to 
be: 
 
The "Problem" with "our" judgements 
 
"Here then is Mrs. Foot's problem: Why is it that the trolley driver may turn his 
trolley, though the surgeon may not remove the young man's lungs, kidneys, 
and heart? In both cases, one will die if the agent acts, but five will live 
who would otherwise die -- a net saving of four lives. What difference in 
the other facts of these cases explains the moral difference between 
them?" (Thomson 1985: 1396) [my emphasis] 
 
 
So according to Thomson, even though taking a certain action in Trolley and taking a 
certain other action in Transplant would both result in the same outcome — the same 
outcome, that is, understood in terms of the number of lives lost/preserved — "we" 
allegedly assess the two actions differently, judging one action to be permissible and 
the other not. And this, so the claim goes, is problematic. 
 
	 36	
Thomson's question, "What difference in the other facts of these cases explains 
the moral difference between them?", is not a rhetorical one because in her 1985 
paper she goes on to spell out what she takes to be the correct answer to the 
question.  
 
I can infer a couple of things from the question itself.  
 
Firstly, there is the expectation that there might be something which could explain 
why "we" have differing judgements about Trolley and Transplant. 
 
Secondly, that explanatory thing comes in the form of some sort of difference 
between the "facts", the descriptive details, of Trolley and of Transplant.  
 
In other words, the idea is that "we" arrive at different judgements because "we" 
are responding to some important, morally relevant difference in detail between 
Trolley and Transplant. And that difference needs to be identified.  
 
Foot, Thomson, and Kamm are just three philosophers among others who try their 
hand at suggesting what that morally relevant difference might be.  
 
But why would "our" differing moral assessments be considered problematic in the 
first place?  
 
The decision-makers in Trolley and Transplant would each be acting under different 
circumstances, so at least on the face of it, it may not be completely surprising if "we" 
were to judge their actions differently, even if their actions bring about the same 
outcome, in a sense. 
 
I think "our" differing judgements are deemed problematic because they may signal 
that inconsistency -- the one bogeyman that philosophers try very hard to avoid -- 
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exists amongst "our" body of moral beliefs. They tell "us" that "we" have different, 
opposing moral judgements about structurally similar situations.  
 
And these are not just any old situations. These are allegedly cases where "we" 
have strong convictions about "our" moral assessments.  
 
In Foot's description of "our" judgements about Trolley and Transplant, she used 
words and phrases that indicate strong conviction, including: "most of us would 
be appalled", "we still find ourselves horrified by the idea", "we should say, without 
hesitation", "We say with regret that we cannot", "We feel bound to let", "we [do] 
not feel justified" [my emphases; see Table 1, column 2, for Foot's original 
sentences]. 
 
In Thomson 1985, "our" original differing moral judgements about Trolley and 
Transplant remain unchanged. In fact, they take on the role of key judgements that 
any putative moral principle needs to explicate. In Thomson's paper, she proceeds to 
create variants of Trolley and Transplant, and to generate more judgements from 
these variant cases.  
 
 
2.6 A Closer Look at Thomson 1985  
 
In Foot 1967, Foot proposes the Doctrine of Double Effect as a principle that could 
explicate "our" differing moral judgements about cases like Trolley and Transplant. 
 
In Thomson 1985, Thomson critiques Foot's suggested principle, and follows up by 
suggesting what she believes is a better principle.  
 
I will now take a closer look at what Thomson says. 
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Thomson begins by organising Foot's ideas. According to Thomson, this is how Foot 
explains the difference in moral judgements about Trolley and Transplant. It looks as 
if two explicatory principles are at work here: 
  
"... the surgeon's case is between operating, in which case he kills one, and 
not operating, in which case he lets five die; and killing is surely worse than 
letting die – indeed, so much worse that we can even say 
  
[Thesis] (I) Killing one is worse than letting five die. 
  
So the surgeon must refrain from operating. By contrast, the trolley driver's 
choice is between turning the trolley, in which case he kills one, and not 
turning the trolley, in which case he does not let five die, he 
positively kills them. Now surely we can say 
  
[Thesis] (II) Killing five is worse than one. 
  
But then that is why the trolley driver may turn his trolley: He would be doing 
what is worse if he fails to turn it, since if he fails to turn it he kills five."  
 
 
Source: (Thomson 1985: 1396 – 1397) [my emphases] 
  
 
Thesis (I) is meant to explicate Foot's judgement in Transplant, while thesis (II) is 
meant to explicate her judgement in Trolley.  
 
At this point, I find it helpful to introduce diagrams to better keep track of the cases 








(A note about these diagrams: the circles keep track of the absolute number of lives 
lost/preserved. A shaded circle represents 1 life lost. And an unshaded circle 
represents 1 life preserved.) 
 
Foot's first thesis says that "(I) Killing one is worse than letting five die". When the 
thesis is applied to Transplant, it says that operating is worse than not operating. 
Because operating is worse, the surgeon is not morally permitted to operate.  
 
 
2.7 My own observations about Thesis (I) 
  
I observe that what Thesis (I) does, is that it ranks the available options in terms 
of goodness/badness. Here, there are exactly two options, and the thesis identifies 
one as being worse than the other. Presumably, the thesis means to say that killing 
one is morally worse than letting five die.  
 
However, even when the comparison is in terms of moral goodness/badness, I think 
that applying Thesis (I) to Transplant does not by itself show which option is morally 
permissible. The thesis simply says that one option is morally worse than the other. 
	 40	
But technically, it doesn't go on to say if the decision-maker should pick the morally 
better option. 
 
Applying Thesis (I) on its own, and getting a ranking of options, is still consistent with 
four distinct possibilities, namely: 
  
• "killing one" and "letting five die" are both morally permissible 
• "killing one" and "letting five die" are both morally impermissible  
o (this would be a case of 'damned if you do, damned if you don't') 
• "killing one" is morally permissible, but "letting five die" is impermissible 
• "killing one" is morally impermissible, but "letting five die" is permissible.  
  
  
Later on in Thomson's paper, she states that perhaps "assessments of which acts are 
worse than which other acts do not by themselves settle the question [as to] what it is 
permissible for an agent to do" (Thomson 1985: 1400). This is, in my view, a plausible 
thing to say indeed. 
 
I think that, in order to get from Thesis (I), "Killing one is worse than letting five die", to 
the conclusion that "the surgeon must refrain from operating", there has to be an 
additional, bridging principle.  
 
That bridging principle might say something like this: whenever a pair of options is 
available to a decision-maker, and one option is morally worse than the other, it is 
impermissible for him/her to choose the morally worse option. To choose the 
worse option would be to do the morally wrong thing.  
 
Adding such a bridging principle would then produce an argument like this: 
  
P1. "Killing one is [morally] worse than letting five die." 
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P2. In Transplant, operating kills one, while not operating lets five die.  
  
P3. Thus, operating is morally worse than letting five die (P1, P2). 
  
P4. [Bridging principle] Whenever a pair of options is available to a 
decision-maker, and one option is morally worse than the other, it is 
impermissible for him/her to choose the morally worse option. 
  




2.8 My own observations about Thesis (II) 
 




My observation about the need for a bridging principle to accompany Thesis (I) also 
applies to Foot's Thesis (II).  
 
Instead of explicating the Transplant case, Thesis (II) is instead meant to explicate 
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Foot's judgement in the Trolley case. 
 
Thesis (II) says that "Killing five is worse than killing one". When applied to Trolley, 
the thesis says that not turning the trolley is worse than turning it. Foot's judgement is 
that it is permissible to turn the trolley.  
 
However, as with Thesis (I), I think there has to be a bridging principle to get from 
Thesis (II) to Foot's desired conclusion.  
 
Adding a putative bridging principle may produce an argument such as this one: 
  
P1. "Killing five is worse than killing one". 
  
P2. In Trolley, not turning the trolley kills five, while turning it kills one.  
  
P3. Thus, in Trolley, not turning the trolley is worse than turning it (P1, P2).  
  
P4. [Bridging principle] Whenever a pair of options is available to a 
decision-maker, and one option is morally worse than the other, it is 
impermissible for him/her to choose the morally worse option. 
  
C. Therefore, in Trolley, it is impermissible for the trolley driver to not turn the 
trolley (P3, P4). 
  
  
The only morally permissible option for the trolley driver is to thus turn the trolley.  
 
The above is just one possible way to articulate the argument, if a bridging principle 
were included. I do not know if Thomson would have applied theses (I) and (II) in the 
exact same way -- or if she would have articulated the argument differently -- 
	 43	




2.9 Thomson's critique of Foot 
 
So far, aside from giving the Trolley and Transplant cases more details, and aside 
from organising Foot's ideas into Theses (I) and (II), Thomson has agreed with how 
Foot describes the alternative options in Transplant and Trolley.  
 
Thomson has no problems with labelling the options themselves as "killing" or 
"letting" die. Thomson agrees that in Transplant the options are "killing" one versus 
"letting" five die, and in Trolley the options are "killing" one versus "killing" five: 
 
"... if the surgeon fails to operate, he does not kill his five patients who need 
parts; he merely lets them die. By contrast, if the driver fails to turn his trolley, 
he does not merely let the five track workmen die; he drives his trolley into 
them, and thereby kills them" (Thomson 1985: 1397). 
 
 
However, Thomson's point of contention is that Theses (I) and (II) do not really 
explicate all the relevant moral judgements pertaining to cases like Trolley and 
Transplant.  
 
To begin with, Thomson claims that when thesis (I) is applied to a new 
hypothetical case -- a distinct variant of Trolley called Bystander – thesis (I) yields a 
conclusion which contradicts Thomson's own moral judgement about what the 
agent in the new case is permitted to do. And this contradiction is supposed to count 
against thesis (I). 
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Let's examine this new case, of Thomson's own invention, that she calls the 
Bystander case. This new case is found in Thomson 1987, but not in Foot 1967. It 
goes like this: 
  
Bystander at the Switch 
  
" ... let us now consider a case I will call Bystander at the Switch. In [this] 
case you have been strolling by the trolley track, and you can see the 
situation at a glance: The driver saw the five on the track ahead, he stamped 
on the brakes, the brakes failed, so he fainted. What to do? Well, here is the 
switch, which you can throw, thereby turning the trolley yourself. Of course 
you will kill one if you do. But I should think you may turn it all the same". 
(Thomson 1985: 1397) [my emphasis] 
  
  
Here is what Thomson thinks about Bystander.  
 
She says that "[s]ome people may feel a difference between [Trolley and Bystander]". 
Whereas the trolley driver is "charged by the trolley company with responsibility for 
the safety of his passengers and anyone else who might be harmed by the trolley he 
drives", the bystander "is a private person who just happens to be there" (Thomson 
1985: 1397). 
  
Crucially, Thomson also thinks that if the driver does not turn the trolley, "the driver 
would be driving a trolley into the five". But if the bystander does not throw the switch, 
"the bystander would not [be driving a trolley into the five]" (Thomson 1985: 1397). 
Instead, "the bystander will do the five no harm at all if he does not throw the 




Thomson believes that "it [is] right to feel these differences between the cases" 
(Thomson 1985: 1397).  
 
And so she characterises the bystander's alternative options as follows: 
  
"It is plain that if the bystander throws the switch, he causes the trolley to hit 
the one, and thus he kills the one. It is equally plain that if the bystander 
does not throw the switch, he does not cause the trolley to hit the five, he 
does not kill the five, he merely fails to save them – he lets them die. His 
choice therefore is between throwing the switch, in which case he kills one, 
and not throwing the switch, in which case he lets five die" (Thomson 
1985: 1398–1399) [my emphases]. 
  
  
Here, I observe that Thomson considers her way of describing the alternative 
actions in Bystander obvious – "plain". Presumably, she considers her description 
to be clearly the case.  
 
This is an important thing to notice, whether or not one happens to agree with how 
Thomson describes the alternative options in Bystander. Here's why. 
 
Recall that Foot's theses (I) and (II) basically make a distinction between "killing" and 
"letting die". Choosing to describe an action as "killing" as opposed to "letting die" (or 
vice versa), will certainly affect the conclusion that the theses yield about that action. 
 
Thomson's choice of description thus has a huge impact.  
 
The choice of description is not a moral "intuition" as I have characterised it in 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation, because choice of description is technically not a case 
judgement – it is not a judgement about what's (im)permissible to do in some situation.  
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Nevertheless, Thomson's choice of description is still a non-inferred judgement in 
this sense: Thomson judges that certain actions ought to be labelled or described in a 
certain way, and she finds those descriptions so obviously fitting, that they do not 
need to be explained or justified by appeal to any prior ideas. 
 
At any rate, with her choice of description for the Bystander case firmly in place, 
Thomson then goes on to use the case – along with her own judgements about what 
actions are morally (im)permissible in the situation – as an important part in building 
her argument against the explicatory powers of Foot's theses (I) and (II).  
 
I hope the above has made it clear that, when Thomson tries to show that Foot's 
theses (I) and (II) are not as explicatory as Foot thinks they are, Thomson herself 
makes use of a new, hypothetical "clear case" (the Bystander case). And she makes 
use of her own case judgements about Bystander, to further her argument. 
 
Thus, in both Foot 1967 and Thomson 1985, case judgements about the 
(im)permissibility of actions in particular situations play a pivotal role in both 
constructing as well as critiquing philosophical arguments. 
 
So far, then, I have looked at two out of the three prominent ethics papers I selected 




• "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect" (1967) by 
Philippa Foot,  
• "The Trolley Problem" (1985) by Judith Jarvis Thomson,  




This leaves me with one remaining paper, Frances Kamm's "Harming Some to Save 
Others" (1989). 
 
In Kamm 1989, Kamm's argumentative strategy follows in much the same vein as 
Thomson's and Foot's. In Kamm's case, however, she creates many, many more 
variant cases of Trolley, Transplant, and Bystander. And she goes on to claim 
that certain case judgements about them are "commonsensical". As such, according 
to Kamm, any putative moral principle needs to explicate these case judgements. 
Just as Thomson did, Kamm likewise criticises a few putative principles suggested by 
other philosophers on precisely this basis: according to Kamm, those principles are 
not able to explicate "commonsensical" moral assessments about her variant cases. 
 
In my view, however, going through Kamm's many variant cases would not be 
particularly instructive for the purposes of my dissertation, because Kamm uses those 
variant cases in similar ways to Thomson and Foot, and I have already illustrated 
those ways in this chapter.  
 
Nevertheless, the next chapter, Chapter 3, will still be on Kamm. This is because 
Kamm explicitly speaks about her philosophical method and her intuition use – 
the method shared by Thomson and Foot – at length, in another text. It is in light 
of this reason that examining Kamm's thought becomes instructive. 
 
By this stage of the dissertation, I hope to have illustrated with some clarity what 
intuition use looks like in Foot, Thomson, and Kamm's papers. In the next chapter, I 







FRANCES KAMM EXPLAINS HER INTUITION USE 
 
3.1 Kamm is interviewed by Alex Voorhoeve 
 
In January 2003, Frances Kamm was interviewed by Alex Voorhoeve. In that 
interview, titled "In Search of the Deep Structure of Morality" and published in 
Voorhoeve's collection of interviews, Conversations on Ethics (2009), Voorhoeve 
questions Kamm directly about the method she uses in doing moral philosophy, 
including her extensive use of moral intuitions. 
 
 
3.2 Kamm speaks about her intuition use 
 
In the interview, Kamm makes it clear that "very rarely reach[es] conclusions that 
differ radically from ... everyday morality", because her approach is "generally to 
stick with our common moral judgements", which she "share[s] and take[s] 
seriously" (Voorhoeve 2009: 20) [my emphasis]. 
 
It also becomes apparent what Kamm takes the moral philosopher's role to be. In a 
situation where: 
 
(1) "the observer's initial judgement [about a particular case] may be uncertain", 
or 
(2) where the observer "may have a strongly held intuitive judgement that he is 
unable to support with reasons", 
 
the moral philosopher's role, for Kamm, may be this: 
 
"to draw attention to various aspects of the case that provide reasons for 
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coming to a moral judgement about it" (Voorhoeve 2009: 22). 
 
 
At any rate, when Kamm articulates the method she uses in moral philosophy, it 
becomes clear that there are two distinct parts, or phases, to that method.  
 
In the first part of her method, Kamm forms a considered judgement. Here, she 
takes pains to emphasise that it is a considered judgement she forms, not a hasty 
one: 
 
" ... I don't really have a considered judgement about a case until I have a 
visual experience of it. I have to deeply imagine myself in a certain situation, 
with an open mind. It is almost as if you are looking at something with no 
preconceptions. You have to attend to it, and then things will pop out at you. 
First you may get the intuitive judgement of what you really should do in the 
circumstance you are imagining" (Voorhoeve 2009: 22). 
 
 
And then, after the formation of a considered judgement, comes the second part of 
Kamm's method. Here, she starts to think about what factor could have led her to 
form the considered judgement that she forms: 
 
"Then you wonder, 'Why am I reaching this conclusion?' And your inner 
eye focuses on one factor as driving this judgement. I suppose that it is 
the same sort of thing when you look at a painting. Make sure you are 
attending to it and aren't having stray thoughts. You start to focus on what is 
so fascinating about it. And it can take a while. You can develop a whole 
theory about what is causing you to have an aesthetic judgement, and 





When I read Kamm's interview carefully, I find that Kamm actually has a qualified 
view about her use of moral intuitions. 
 
To begin with, Kamm clarifies what she means by "intuition". She says that, even 
though "[t]he term 'intuition' has a long history", she is herself "just talking 
about a judgement about a case". Importantly, she notes that "[t]hese 
judgements may be wrong, and we need to be able to give reasons for them, 
reasons which are not simply our emotional responses". In a reference to 
Thomson 1985, Kamm mentions that she thinks it is precisely this attempt to supply 
reasons for case judgements, that Thomson "is trying to get us to do" (Voorhoeve 
2009: 23). 
 
Kamm distances herself from "[t]he idea that we just 'see' or 'intuit' the right response 
to a moral case", because such a conception of intuitive judgement "suggests that 
such judgements are simply personal emotional responses or that we use a 
mysterious faculty in order to make them" (Voorhoeve 2009: 22–23). 
 
Kamm states that "the mere fact that we have a certain response to various 
trolley cases doesn't indicate to us that there is a good reason to act on that 
response". In other words, it "doesn't solve the problem of normativity" (Voorhoeve 
2009: 29). 
 
Despite referring to case judgements that are supposedly shared by a common "we" 
or "us" in her 1989 paper, in the interview with Voorhoeve Kamm recognises that "a 
lot of people agree[ing] doesn't show that something is correct". After all, even 
if many people share the same case judgement, that still "doesn't help to 
support the normative authority of the judgement" (Voorhoeve 2009: 27–28). 
Many people could still be making the same, wrong case judgement. 
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Kamm acknowledges that she has, for one, "taken the view that many intuitive 
judgements reflect some deep structure not completely accessible to the person who 
has it and that this structure may be universal" (Voorhoeve 2009: 27–28).  
 
And yet, at the same time, Kamm wants the formation of moral judgements to be "a 
rational capacity", not "some remnant of the primitive part of the organism". She 
"want[s] to know if morality is something that rational beings could choose to develop; 
[not just] that they did develop it" (Voorhoeve 2009: 27–28). 
 
For Kamm, the question of why people should do as their case judgements tell them 
to, "would be solved" upon discovering principles that do two things:  
 
(1) "that explain our case judgements"  




Of course, the problem of normativity – the question of why people should even act 
as their case judgements tell them to – does not go away, even with this strategy, 
because it could be that "the principles that best explain our case judgements fail to 
embody morally significant ideas" (Voorhoeve 2009: 29). 
 
Voorhoeve articulates the problem in this way: 
 
The reason we can't simply stop at the considered case judgements in 
which we have greatest confidence, or at the relatively superficial 
principles that explain them is that there is a further question to ask: 
Why should we act as our moral judgement tells us we should? After all, 
adhering to moral requirements may be costly – we may have to 
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sacrifice our aims, our lives, or the lives of others in order to respect 
moral requirements. A critical understanding of morality therefore requires 
that we understand which values are expressed in the moral principles that 
explain our case judgements and that we can judge whether these values are 
worth respecting or promoting (Voorhoeve 2009: 32) [my emphasis]. 
 
 
In the event that the explicatory principles really do not capture anything morally 
significant, Kamm says that she is "prepared to accept as a possibility that ... the 
intuitive judgements in particular cases are not worth adhering to". Nevertheless, 
Kamm states that her response would first be to "think more deeply about [the 
principle] because I must be missing something" (Voorhoeve 2009: 29–30). 
 
In a sense, then, Kamm's intuition use and her way of doing moral philosophy is 
similar to the philosophical strategy known as "reflective equilibrium". Reflective 
equilibrium, as summarised by Voorhoeve, would refer to the method of: 
 
... working back and forth among our judgements about particular cases, the 
principles we believe to govern them, and the considerations we believe to 
bear on accepting these judgements or principles, revising any of these 
elements wherever necessary in order to achieve an acceptable coherence 
among them. We achieve reflective equilibrium when we arrive at an 
acceptable coherence among these beliefs (Voorhoeve 2009: 29, footnote). 
 
 
Nevertheless, Kamm states that she differs from "some other proponents of the 
method of reflective equilibrium", in that she is "much less willing to give up [her] 
intuitions in particular cases", as compared to them (Voorhoeve 2009: 29). 
 
Finally, Kamm tries to articulate the value or worth that she sees in her philosophical 
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method. For Kamm, even though "our responses to [particular] cases may undermine 
the validity of the [explicatory] principle [we have in mind]", the valuable "lesson" to be 
drawn from this is that "these variations save you from overgeneralisation, from 
an immediate attachment to a moral principle". For her, given that "[t]here is so 
much variation" in particular cases, Kamm just doesn't think that "very general 
principles we immediately jump to can possibly be correct" (Voorhoeve 2009: 25) 
[my emphases].  
 
At this stage of the dissertation, I hope to have painted a more nuanced picture of 
Kamm's philosophical method and intuition use. Even as Kamm makes extensive use 
of intuitive case judgements in her work, she is not, after all, unaware of the need to 
provide reasons to support those judgements.  
 
What I will proceed to do, after this, is to present Daniel Kahneman's comments on 
Kamm's intuition use. Kahneman, a psychologist and behavioural economist, is the 
world's leading scholar studying how people form judgements and make decisions. 
Like Kamm, Kahneman is also interviewed by Voorhoeve, and his interview is also 
published in Conversations on Ethics (2009). Voorhoeve lays out the details of 
Kamm's philosophical method to Kahneman, and invites Kahneman to say what he 






DANIEL KAHNEMAN PRESENTS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF SYSTEMATIC 
ERRORS IN INTUITIVE JUDGEMENTS 
 
4.1 Kahneman is interviewed by Alex Voorhoeve 
 
In September 2006, Daniel Kahneman was interviewed by Alex Voorhoeve about his 
views on the kind of intuition use exemplified by the work of someone such as 
Frances Kamm. That interview, titled "Can We Trust Our Intuitions?", is published 
in Voorhoeve's collection of interviews, Conversations on Ethics (2009). 
 
 
4.2 Voorhoeve checks if Kamm and Kahneman mean the same thing by the 
term "intuition" 
 
Early on in the interview, Voorhoeve asks Kahneman how he would define "intuition", 
which is "a vague term" (Voorhoeve 2009: 72). 
 
Here is Kahneman's answer: 
 
" ... I have ... used the term to describe an intuitive system, a way of 
generating thoughts that are called intuitive thoughts. The operations of 
this system are typically automatic, quick, effortless, associative, and 
often emotionally charged. Usually, they are not open to introspection, 
and difficult to control or change. This intuitive system generates 
involuntary impressions that come to mind spontaneously, like 
percepts. Intuitive judgements directly reflect these impressions with little 
modification from the reasoning system, which functions very differently from 
the intuitive system: the reasoning system's operations are step by step, slow, 
effortful, and more likely to be consciously controlled and flexible" (Voorhoeve 
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2009: 72–73) [my emphases] 
 
 
In Kahneman's understanding, the human mind operates with two distinct modes 
of cognitive processing, which he refers to as the "intuitive system" and the 
"reasoning system". And these two systems function very differently from one 
another.  
 
For Kahneman, then, "intuitive thoughts" would be thoughts that are the 
product of the intuitive system, as opposed to the reasoning system. 
 
Voorhoeve says that "[t]here appears to be a difference between what [Kahneman] 
call[s] intuitive judgements, understood as a product of the intuitive system, and the 
type of case judgements that philosophers use to build and test their moral theories, 
which they also sometimes refer to as 'intuitions'" (Voorhoeve 2009: 73).  
 
This is because, as Voorhoeve sees it, "[p]hilosophers [like Foot, Thomson, and 
Kamm] typically take [intuitions] to be considered case judgements, that is, 
judgements that arise after reflection on the case and on our reasons for 
judging it as we do, whereas [Kahneman's] category of intuitive judgements 
does not appear to involve such extensive reflection" (Voorhoeve 2009: 73) [my 
emphasis]. 
 
For Voorhoeve, then, the fact that philosophers like Foot, Thomson, and Kamm 
spend time considering and reflecting on their case judgements, seems at first blush 
to differentiate the intuitive judgements they work with, from Kahneman's "typically 
automatic, quick, effortless, associative, ... often emotionally charged ... not open to 
introspection ... difficult to control or change [and] involuntary" intuitive thoughts 
(Voorhoeve 2009: 72–73). 
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Nevertheless, Voorhoeve posits a connection between Kamm's case judgements and 
Kahneman's "intuitive thoughts": 
 
"Perhaps the relation between the two types of judgements is as follows. 
Philosophers start with a judgement about a case that comes to mind 
quickly and automatically and that may be emotionally laden -- what 
[Kahneman] would call an intuitive judgement. They then examine 
whether they can find reasons to regard it as unreliable or biased. If they 
find no such reason, it is presumptively treated as a valid case judgement, 
and they try to find principles that explain the judgement, in part by reflecting 
further on what caused them to arrive at the judgement in question. An 
example of someone who uses this approach is Frances Kamm ... " 
(Voorhoeve 2009: 73) [my emphasis]. 
 
 
Unlike Voorhoeve, I do not view the considered judgement nature of Foot, 
Thomson, and Kamm's case judgements as something that necessarily 
differentiates them from Kahneman's "intuitive thoughts".  
 
This is an important point for my dissertation. Just because the case 
judgements in Foot, Thomson, and Kamm are considered judgements, that 
does not straightforwardly inoculate them from Kahneman's empirical findings 
about "intuitive thoughts" (about intuition as Kahneman conceives of them). 
 
In my view, even if Kamm's "case judgements" and Kahneman's "intuitive 
thoughts" do not match exactly, there are still similarities between them – 
similarities that merit further examination. 
 




4.3 Similarities between Kamm's "case judgements" and Kahneman's "intuitive 
thoughts" 
 
Let me represent the various characteristics of "case judgements" and "intuitive 
thoughts" in the form of a bulleted list. I will put in bold the characteristics that I think 
are shared. 
 
Kahneman's "intuitive thought" is: 
 
• The product of the mind's intuitive system, not its reasoning system, 
which means intuitive thought is not "step by step, slow, effortful, and 
... consciously controlled" 
• Typically automatic, coming to mind spontaneously, like percepts 
• Quick 
• Effortless 
• Associative (it has not yet been clarified what Kahneman means by 
"associative", at this stage of the dissertation) 
• Often emotionally charged 
• Not open to introspection (this characteristic is ambiguous and its true 
meaning has yet to be clarified) 
• Difficult to control or change  
 
Source: (Voorhoeve 2009: 72–73) 
 
 
Foot, Thomson, and Kamm's "case judgement" is: 
 
• a "case" judgement 
o a judgement about the moral (im)permissibility of some action in a 
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particular situation/case 
• a non-inferred judgement 
o a judgement which is not a conclusion inferred from a prior 
series of premises 
• a "considered" judgement 
o a judgement formed after giving a case one's undivided attention, 
and being fully present and attending to the case with care 
• a judgement that is taken seriously 
• a judgement that is used as a starting point in ethical inquiry 
• and it is a judgement that is either (i) believed by the philosopher to be 
already shared by other people, or (ii) believed by the philosopher to be 
a judgement that should be shared by other people)  
 




From what I have previously established about Foot, Thomson, and Kamm's use of 
case judgements, I think the following statements about the connection between 
"case judgements" and "intuitive thoughts" can be established: 
 
Connection's between Kamm's "case judgements" and Kahneman's 
"intuitive thoughts" 
 
1. Case judgements, like Kahneman's "intuitive thoughts" ... are formed more or 
less automatically, quickly, effortlessly, and spontaneously. 
 
There is no evidence of Foot, Thomson, or Kamm struggling to form 
a judgement about what's (im)permissible in their clear cases. What 
the three philosophers struggle with is finding and testing a suitable 
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explicatory principle for the judgements, not with forming the 
judgements themselves. Foot, Thomson, and Kamm thought of their 
clear cases, and right after that formed their case judgements. They 
did not expend a great deal of effort in forming those judgements. 
 
2. Case judgements, like Kahneman's "intuitive thoughts" ... come to mind 
without being a conclusion inferred from prior thoughts. They are not formed 
via a "step by step, slow, effortful, and consciously controlled [reasoning] 
process". 
 
My reader would know by now that Foot, Thomson, and Kamm 
spend the bulk of their papers trying to find an underlying principle 
that could explicate their case judgements. The case judgements 
themselves are not the logical entailments of a prior process of 
reasoning. Reasoning about the case judgements – thinking about 
what could explicate them – happens after the case judgements are 
formed. 
 
3. Case judgements, like Kahneman's "intuitive thoughts" ... are often 
emotionally charged. 
 
Recall Foot's description of "us" being "appalled", "horrified", feeling 
"regret", or feeling as if "we" were "bound" when "we" consider doing 
certain actions in the clear cases. (See Chapter 2 of this dissertation, 
which contains Table 1, "List of hypothetical cases in Foot 1967"). 
 
 
4. Case judgements, like Kahneman's "intuitive thoughts" ... are "difficult to 
control or change". 
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My reader would also know by now that Foot, Thomson, and Kamm 
take their case judgements seriously. They believe that their 
judgements are shared – or should be shared – by many other 
people. And in Kamm's interview with Voorhoeve, Kamm makes it 
clear that she would not give up her case judgements lightly. 
 
 
Case judgements may be considered judgements – a characteristic that is not 
mentioned by Kahneman, when he speaks about his conception of "intuitive thought" 
– but case judgements still have quite a bit in common with "intuitive thought". 
 
More connections exist between "case judgements" and "intuitive thoughts", and 
those connections will become apparent as this dissertation explores Kahneman's 
empirical work in greater detail. 
 
 
4.4 Kahneman's two-system model of the mind 
 
I will now look closer at what Kahneman means by the "intuitive system" of the mind, 
as opposed to its "reasoning system". 
 
In his book, Thinking, fast and slow (2011), Daniel Kahneman gives an overview of 
his "two-system model of the mind". Kahneman basically distinguishes between two 
distinct modes of cognitive processing, which he calls fast thinking (the "intuitive 
system" of the mind mentioned earlier) and slow thinking (the "reasoning system" of 
the mind). 
 
Kahneman demonstrates the main difference between fast and slow thinking using 
the following exercise. "To observe your mind in automatic mode", he tells the reader, 
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Source: (Kahneman 2011: 19) 
 
This is what Kahneman subsequently observes: 
 
Your experience as you look at the woman's face seamlessly combines what 
we normally call seeing and intuitive thinking. As surely and quickly as you 
saw that the young woman's hair is dark, you knew she is angry. Furthermore, 
what you saw extended into the future. You sensed that this woman is about 
to say some very unkind words, probably in a loud and strident voice. A 
premonition of what she was going to do next came to mind automatically 
and effortlessly. You did not intend to assess her mood or to anticipate what 
she might do, and your reaction to the picture did not have the feel of 
something you did. It just happened to you. It was an instance of fast 
thinking" (Kahneman 2011: 19–20) 
 
 
And then, Kahneman asks the reader to try a different exercise, namely: 
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17 x 24 = ? 
 
(Source: Kahneman 2011: 20) 
 
 
Kahneman observes that one would know "immediately that this is a multiplication 
problem, and ... that [one] could solve it, with paper and pencil, if not without. [One 
would also have] had some vague intuitive knowledge of the range of possible 
results ..." (Kahneman 2011: 20). 
 
That said, "[w]ithout spending some time on the problem ... [one] would not be certain 
that the answer is not 568". Kahneman explains: 
 
"A precise solution did not come to mind, and you felt that you could choose 
whether or not to engage in the computation ... [In attempting the 
multiplication problem] ... [y]ou experienced slow thinking as you proceeded 
through a sequence of steps. You first retrieved from memory the cognitive 
program for multiplication that you learned in school, then you implemented it. 
Carrying out the computation was a strain. You felt the burden of holding 
much material in memory, as you needed to keep track of where you were 
and of where you were going, while holding on to the intermediate result. The 
process was mental work: deliberate, effortful, and orderly – a prototype of 
slow thinking. The computation was not only an event in your mind; your 
body was also involved. Your muscles tensed up, your blood pressure rose, 
and your heart rate increased. Someone looking closely at your eyes while 
you tackled this problem would have seen your pupils dilate. Your pupils 
contracted back to normal size as soon as you ended your work – when you 




In essence, fast thinking happens when mental events occur in a swift and automatic 
fashion, without the human subject having to exert much (or any) effort. When these 
mental events occur, some of them happen entirely outside of the subject’s voluntary 
control (for example: opening one's eyes and perceiving one's surroundings), while 
others can be brought under voluntary control, even though they happen 
automatically most of the time (for example: breathing). 
 
In contrast, slow thinking happens when mental events occur in a slower, more 
effortful, and more conscious fashion. Such mental events demand attention. When 
attention is disrupted, cognitive processing is usually affected – cognitive 
performance suffers. When slow thinking happens, the subject has a sense of agency, 
of being able to choose where and how to focus her attention and concentration. 
 
Some mental events which possess the characteristics of slow thinking can become 
fast thinking mental events through extended practice on the subject’s part. This is 
what happens when an individual gains expertise and becomes skilled in a particular 
domain. For example, a basketball player who is very new to the game would have to 
expend considerable cognitive energy when she tries to execute a proper crossover 
dribble, but a seasoned basketball player would need to expend far less energy 
executing the same move. 
 
To make the contrast between the two modes of cognitive processing even clearer, 
here are more examples of fast and slow thinking. 
 
More examples of fast and slow thinking 
 
Fast thinking would include the following: 
 
• Detect that one object is more distant than another. 
• Orient to the source of a sudden sound. 
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• Complete the phrase “bread and ...” 
• Make a “disgust face” when shown a horrible picture. 
• Detect hostility in a voice. 
• Answer to 2 + 2 = ? 
• Read words on large billboards. 
• Drive a car on an empty road. 
• Find a strong move in chess (if you are a chess master). 
• Understand simple sentences. 
• Recognise that a “meek and tidy soul with a passion for detail” 
resembles an occupational stereotype. 
 
Source: (Kahneman 2011: 21) 
 
 
And slow thinking would include the following: 
 
• Brace for the starter gun in a race. 
• Focus attention on the clowns in the circus. 
• Focus on the voice of a particular person in a crowded and noisy 
room. 
• Look for a woman with white hair. 
• Search memory to identify a surprising sound. 
• Maintain a faster walking speed than is natural for you. 
• Monitor the appropriateness of your behaviour in a social situation. 
• Count the occurrences of the letter a in a page of text. 
• Tell someone your phone number. 
• Park in a narrow space (for everyone except garage attendants). 
• Compare two washing machines for overall value. 
• Fill out a tax form. 
• Check the validity of a complex logical argument. 
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Source: (Kahneman 2011: 22) 
 
 
Just to be clear, fast and slow thinking do not each reside in any one part of the 
human brain. Also, at any point in time when a human subject is awake, he or 
she is engaged in both modes of thinking: both fast and slow thinking are 
active at the same time. 
 
 
4.5 How fast and slow thinking relate to one another 
 
Kahneman explains that human beings have a "limited budget of attention". The total 
amount of attention that can be paid by any one individual is simply finite. Attempts to 
go beyond this limit will not succeed. Tasks which are cognitively taxing (more 
effortful) use up more attention, and when human subjects try to do too many of them 
at the same time, their cognitive performance will take a hit. 
 
Attention is jointly managed by fast and slow thinking in a “highly efficient” division of 
labour, which “minimises effort and optimises performance”.  
 
Most of the time, fast thinking tasks run automatically, beneath the subject's level of 
awareness, taking up little to no attention at all, while slow thinking operates in a 
"comfortable, low-effort" mode. 
 
Fast thinking constantly and automatically generates “impressions, intuitions, 
intentions, feelings”, which are ‘suggestions’ that slow thinking can either adopt or 
veto. When slow thinking adopts these suggestions, impressions and intuitions turn 
into beliefs, and impulses turn into voluntary actions. Fast thinking suggestions are 
usually taken on by slow thinking as they are, with “little or no modification”. 
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It is only when fast thinking runs into a question or problem it cannot solve that slow 
thinking begins working harder and using up more attention. When this happens, slow 
thinking engages a larger fraction of its capacity, and lends "more detailed and 
specific" processing to the task at hand. 
 
This division of labour between fast and slow thinking works very well because fast 
thinking is constantly maintaining a model of the subject's world that is, by and large, 
accurate and up to date. Fast thinking keeps track of what events would count as 
'normal' and what events would be surprises, and it makes short-term predictions that 
are, for the most part, accurate. Most of the time, fast thinking also responds quickly 
and appropriately to the challenges it faces. By calling upon more effortful slow 
thinking engagement only when difficulties arise, such as when fast thinking comes 
across something that does not fit its model of the world, attention – a finite and 
valuable resource – is thus conserved. 
 
However, even though the division of labour works well, it is nevertheless not perfect, 
because under certain specific conditions, fast thinking has a strong tendency to 
make "systematic errors". These errors are known as biases.  
 
Although slow thinking has some ability to keep fast thinking in check, slow thinking is 
also "lazy", averse to exerting more effort than is strictly necessary. As such, a lot of 
the time slow thinking does not notice, and does not mitigate, fast thinking biases. 
 
Later on in this chapter, I will focus on at least one specific bias that I think is 
particularly relevant to the kind of intuition use found in Foot, Thomson, and Kamm's 
papers. 
 
For now, a summary of the relationship between fast and slow thinking is due: 
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Summary of the relationship between fast and slow thinking 
 
• The human subject’s limited budget of attention is jointly managed by fast 
and slow thinking in an efficient division of labour 
• Fast thinking generates impressions, intuitions, impulses and feelings which 
slow thinking can endorse or reject 
• When fast thinking encounters a question it cannot answer, slow thinking is 
mobilised to provide more detailed and effortful processing 
• Slow thinking is in charge of self-control: it monitors the human subject’s own 
behaviour 
• Fast thinking has little understanding of logic and statistics, and under certain 
conditions it makes systematic errors (it has “biases”) 
• Slow thinking follows the law of least effort: it is usually too lazy to examine 
fast thinking’s suggestions carefully. 
 
 
After learning about Kahneman's two-system model of the mind, my view is that the 
systematic errors (biases) of fast thinking are worth a closer examination. In the 
next section of this chapter, I undertake that examination.  
 
 
4.6 Why fast thinking is beset by systematic errors (biases) 
 
According to Kahneman's research, fast thinking is "generally very good at what it 
does". For instance, "its short-term predictions are usually accurate ... and its initial 
reactions to challenges are swift and generally appropriate" (Kahneman 2011: 25). 
 
To help illustrate his point about fast thinking being usually accurate and reliable, 
Kahneman cites an example presented by psychologist Gary Klein: 
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" ... a team of firefighters ... entered a house in which the kitchen was on fire. 
Soon after they started hosing down the kitchen, the commander heard 
himself shout, "Let's get out of here!" without realising why. The floor 
collapsed almost immediately after the firefighters escaped. Only after the 
fact did the commander realise that the fire had been unusually quiet and 
that his ears had been unusually hot. Together, these impressions 
prompted what he called a 'sixth sense of danger'. He had no idea what 
was wrong, but he knew something was wrong. It turned out that the heart 
of the fire had not been in the kitchen but in the basement beneath where the 
men had stood" (Kahneman 2011: 11) [my emphases]. 
 
 
Nevertheless, fast thinking has a tendency to make systematic errors under certain 
conditions.  
 
This is because fast thinking "sometimes answers easier questions than the one it 
was asked" (Kahneman 2011: 25).  
 
According to Kahneman, when fast thinking encounters a difficult or complex 
problem that it needs to solve, it has a tendency to substitute an easier 
problem in the place of the difficult problem. And it solves that easier problem. 
 
To help illustrate this point, Kahneman presents the example of a large financial firm's 
chief investment officer, whom he met at one point in time: 
 
" ... the chief investment officer ... had just invested some tens of millions of 
dollars in the stock of Ford Motor Company. When [Kahneman] asked how 
he had made that decision, he replied that he had recently attended an 
automobile show and had been impressed. 'Boy, do they know how to make 
a car!' was his explanation. He made it very clear that he trusted his gut 
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feeling and was satisfied with himself and with his decision. [Kahneman] 
found it remarkable that he had apparently not considered the one question 
that an economist would call relevant: Is Ford stock currently underpriced? 
Instead, he had listened to his intuition; he liked the cars, he liked the 
company, and he liked the idea of owning its stock" (Kahneman 2011: 12). 
 
 
Kahneman analyses the chief investment officer's process of arriving at his 
judgement as follows: 
 
"The question that the executive faced (should I invest in Ford stock?) 
was difficult, but the answer to an easier and related question (do I like 
Ford cars?) came readily to his mind and determined his choice" 
(Kahneman 2011: 12) [my emphases]. 
 
 
In essence, fast thinking uses heuristics – mental shortcuts or rules of thumb – to 
solve the problems it encounters. And the thing about the heuristics about fast 
thinking is this: "when faced with a difficult question, [the human subject] often 
answer[s] an easier one instead, usually without noticing the substitution" 
(Kahneman 2011: 12) [my emphasis]. 
 
But how is this feature of fast thinking relevant to intuition use in Foot, 
Thomson, and Kamm? 
 
To begin with, my view is that the problems tackled by Foot, Thomson, and Kamm in 
their papers are not simple, straightforward ones. Let's look again at the Trolley 
problem, for instance: 
 
The Trolley Case 
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"Suppose you are the driver of a trolley. The trolley rounds a bend, and there 
come into view ahead five track workmen, who have been repairing the track. 
The track goes through a bit of a valley at that point, and the sides are steep, 
so you must stop the trolley if you are to avoid running the five men down. 
You step on the brakes, but alas they don't work. Now you suddenly see a 
spur of track leading off to the right. You can turn the trolley onto it, and thus 
save the five men on the straight track ahead. Unfortunately, Mrs. Foot has 
arranged that there is one track workman on that spur of track. He can no 
more get off the track in time than the five can, so you will kill him if you turn 
the trolley onto him. Is it morally permissible for you to turn the trolley? ... 
Everybody to whom I have put this hypothetical case says, Yes, it is." 
(Thomson 1985: 1395) [my emphasis] 
 
 
If one were to take the Trolley seriously – if, as Kamm does, one imaginatively places 
oneself in the shoes of the person who has to make the decision whether or not to 
turn the trolley – I think one would find that the decision is hardly a simple or easy one 
to make. I think that the questions that one has to answer – What might the right 
thing to do be, in this situation?, Would it be morally permissible to turn the 
trolley?, and Why is the right/permissible thing to do the right/permissible thing? 
– do not lend themselves to quick or easy answers.  
 
The answers to these questions are not obvious. And besides, in philosophy,  
 
My worry is that, in trying to answer the challenging questions above, philosophers 
who use intuitions the way Foot, Thomson, and Kamm do may actually have 
answered an easier question instead. They may have substituted an easier question 
in place of the challenging ones, without noticing the substitution. 
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What easier question could have been substituted in place of the challenging ones? 
Well, these are some possibilities: 
 
• What do I feel about turning a trolley onto a living person? 
• Do I feel horrified or appalled at the idea of crushing a living person 
with a trolley? 
 
 
Now, some people may argue that perhaps, when it comes to moral judgements, 
asking the substitute questions set out above may actually be relevant.  
 
But I think that such a claim would be one that requires argument. A case has to be 
articulated for believing that feelings such as being horrified or appalled have a right 
and proper place in the formation of moral judgements. I say this because, on the 
face of it at least, it is not obvious that they do. To illustrate my point, I would like to 
point the reader to the following, hopefully parallel, considerations: 
 
Suppose Person X is trying to figure out the answer to this question: Is gay 
marriage morally permissible? Suppose also that X happens to have feelings 
of disgust whenever X thinks about or encounters gay people. It is not 
obvious that X's feelings of disgust are relevant to the question of whether 
gay marriage is morally permissible. If those feelings are indeed relevant, a 
case has to be articulated for their relevance.  
 
Suppose Person Y is trying to figure out the answer to this question: Is 
abortion morally permissible? Suppose also that Y happens to have feelings 
of sympathy for mothers with unwanted pregnancies. It is not obvious that Y's 
feelings of sympathy are relevant to the question of whether abortion is 
morally permissible. If those feelings are indeed relevant, a case has to be 




In sum, at this stage of the dissertation, I hope to have made clear my worry 
that, in trying to answer challenging moral questions, philosophers who use 
moral intuitions like Foot, Thomson, and Kamm do, may inadvertently be 
answering easier, substitute questions instead.  
 
 
4.7 Framing effects 
 
Fast thinking is also susceptible to a particular bias known as "framing effects".  
 
In essence, when fast thinking is operating with this bias, the human subject forms a 
judgement about a situation based on the way in which the situation is described. If 2 
otherwise identical situations are described using different terms – if they are framed 
differently – the same human subject may form conflicting judgements about them, 
without realising that the situations are in fact identical. 
 
To demonstrate framing effects at work, Daniel Kahneman and his long-time 
collaborator, Amos Tversky, carried out an experiment that is now known as the 
"Asian disease problem". In the experiment, Kahneman and Tversky presented their 
lab study participants with the following problem: 
 
Asian disease problem – frame #1 
 
"Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs 
to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific 
estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
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If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
 
If program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will 
be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved." 
 
[Which program, A or B, would you prefer?] 
 
(Source: Kahneman 2011: 368) [my emphasis] 
 
 
According to Kahneman, a "substantial majority of respondents choose program 
A". They appear to "prefer the certain option over the gamble". 
 
Now consider a second version of the problem: 
 
Asian disease problem – frame #2 
 
"Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs 
to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific 
estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
 
If program A' is adopted, 400 people will die. 
 
If program B' is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will 
die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die." 
 
[Which program, A or B, would you prefer?] 
 




When lab study participants were given this second version of the problem, most of 
them now prefer program B'. They now appear to prefer the gamble over the certain 
option. 
 
However, notice that the only difference between the 2 versions of the problem is 
that in the first version, the outcomes of the programs are framed in terms of the 
number of people being "saved", whereas in the second version, the outcomes are 
framed in terms of the number of people who could "die".  
 
If one were to do the math, the actual outcomes for program A and A' in terms of the 
absolute number of people who end up staying alive after the programs are 
implemented is identical, as are the outcomes for program B and B': 
 
Total number of affected people = 600 
 
If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
Number of people alive as a result of program A = 200. 
 
If program A' is adopted, 400 people will die. 
Number of people alive as a result of program A' = 600 – 400  
      = 200. 
 
If program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people 
will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. 
Number of people alive as a result of program B = (1/3 x 600) + (1/3 x 600) 
      = 200 + 200 
      = 400 
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If program B' is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will 
die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die." 
Number of people alive as a result of program B' = (1/3 x 600) + (1/3 x 600) 
      = 200 + 200 
      = 400 
 
 
According to Kahneman, his collaborator Amos Tversky discovered that even "public-
health professionals", the very people "who make decisions about vaccines and other 
programs", "who make decisions that affect everyone's health", "can be swayed by 
such a superficial manipulation" of the terms used to describe – to frame – a 
situation (Kahneman 2011: 369). 
 
According to Kahneman, "the intuitions that determined the original choice [of going 
for program A and program B'] came from [fast thinking] and had no more moral basis 
than did [a] preference for keeping £20 or [an] aversion to losing £30" (Kahneman 
2011: 369). 
 
In Kahneman's view, sometimes "moral feelings are attached to frames, to 
descriptions of reality rather than to reality itself". Sometimes, "our moral intuitions are 
about descriptions, not substance" (Kahneman 2011: 370). 
 
But how is this feature of fast thinking – this susceptibility to framing effects – 
relevant to intuition use in Foot, Thomson, and Kamm? 
 
Let's look again at the Trolley versus Transplant problems, for instance: 
 
The Trolley Case 
 
"Suppose you are the driver of a trolley. The trolley rounds a bend, and there 
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come into view ahead five track workmen, who have been repairing the track. 
The track goes through a bit of a valley at that point, and the sides are steep, 
so you must stop the trolley if you are to avoid running the five men down. 
You step on the brakes, but alas they don't work. Now you suddenly see a 
spur of track leading off to the right. You can turn the trolley onto it, and thus 
save the five men on the straight track ahead. Unfortunately, Mrs. Foot has 
arranged that there is one track workman on that spur of track. He can no 
more get off the track in time than the five can, so you will kill him if you turn 
the trolley onto him. Is it morally permissible for you to turn the trolley? ... 
Everybody to whom I have put this hypothetical case says, Yes, it is." 
(Thomson 1985: 1395) [my emphasis] 
 
The Transplant Case 
 
"Now consider a second hypothetical case. This time you are to imagine 
yourself to be a surgeon, a truly great surgeon. Among other things you do, 
you transplant organs, and you are such a great surgeon that the organs you 
transplant always take. At the moment you have five patients who need 
organs. Two need one lung each, two need a kidney each, and the fifth 
needs a heart. If they do not get those organs today, they will all die; if you 
find organs for them today, you can transplant the organs and they will all live. 
But where to find the lungs, the kidneys, and the heart? The time is almost up 
when a report is brought to you that a young man who has just come into 
your clinic for his yearly check-up has exactly the right blood-type, and is in 
excellent health. Lo, you have a possible donor. All you need do is cut him up 
and distribute his parts among the five who need them. You ask, but he says, 
"Sorry. I deeply sympathize, but no." Would it be morally permissible for you 
to operate anyway? / Everybody to whom I have put this second 
hypothetical case says, No, it would not be morally permissible for you 




And the "problem" with "our" judgements about the two cases is supposed to be this: 
 
The "Problem" with "our" judgements 
 
"Here then is Mrs. Foot's problem: Why is it that the trolley driver may turn his 
trolley, though the surgeon may not remove the young man's lungs, kidneys, 
and heart? In both cases, one will die if the agent acts, but five will live 
who would otherwise die -- a net saving of four lives. What difference in 
the other facts of these cases explains the moral difference between 
them?" (Thomson 1985: 1396) [my emphasis] 
 
 
I would like to emphasise the fact that the problem of the Trolley versus Transplant 
cases are couched in terms of written scenarios. People respond to these cases 
literally by reading and considering the words that are used to describe the scenarios, 
not by being faced by the actual events in reality.  
 
My worry, then, is this: 
 
(1) Because people form intuitive judgements about the Trolley and Transplant 
cases by reading and considering descriptions that are expressed in 
words, their intuitive judgements could very well be affected by a bias like 
framing effects. 
(2) Furthermore, Kahneman’s examples about framing effects involve how 
people respond to gains and losses (lives “saved” and people “dying”). This 
is similar to how the Trolley and Transplant cases also involve gains and 
losses in terms of lives lost and lives preserved. This is, thus, a further cause 
for worry. Intuitive judgements about the Trolley and Transplant cases could 
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very well be affected by a bias like framing effects. 
(3) If the case judgements in Foot, Thomson, and Kamm’s work are actually 
affected by framing effects, that would mean that those moral intuitions 
are being affected by morally irrelevant considerations. 
 
Before this thesis goes on, however, there is one thing to take note of. 
 
The situations that Kahneman gives to show framing effects have to do with decisions 
involving probability. The Trolley and Transplant cases in ethics, however, do not 
involve such probabilistic decision-making.  
 
Nevertheless, just because there is this difference between Kahneman’s probabilistic 
situations and the ethics cases, it does not automatically mean that the ethics cases 
are free from framing effects. 
 
Here’s why. The whole idea of framing effects boils down to this: different words 
trigger different associated ideas in the human mind, and simply by choosing to use a 
certain word instead of another to describe a situation, one can actually evoke a 
somewhat different reaction in a person who is considering the situation. 
 
To show how this could plausibly work, I am going to suggest how different ideas can 
be triggered by the Trolley and Transplant cases, as they are originally described by 
Thomson using her choice of words (see (A) and (C) in the following pages) – and 
when the cases are phrased slightly differently using a different set of words (see (B) 
and (D) in the following pages). I am not saying that every single person who 
considers the original and rephrased cases will respond with the same associated 
ideas as I do. Nevertheless, the responses I am about to present could very well be 











































































































































































































































































































































































































	4.8 Is there such a thing as “expert intuition” in moral philosophy? 
 
Some people may think that perhaps, just as in domains like chess-playing, there is 
such a thing as “expert intuition” in moral philosophy. Some may think that, just as a 
highly-skilled chess grandmaster can walk past a chess game that’s in progress and 
intuitively know that white will be in checkmate in 3 future moves, or just as a skilled 
physician can make a “complex diagnosis after a single glance at a patient” 
(Kahneman 2011:11), perhaps a moral philosopher’s intuitions about particular cases 
would be more reliable than a non-moral philosopher’s intuitions. 
 
I do think “expert intuition” exists in philosophy – but I think philosophers’ expertise 
lies more in intuitively recognising things like valid and invalid logical moves.  
 
However, I do not think that moral philosophers necessarily have a more reliable 
access to moral truth, moral knowledge, or moral understanding than people who 
are not moral philosophers. In my view, the expertise of moral philosophers lies more 
in the cut and thrust of logic and argumentation pertaining to morality, and not 
necessarily in the content of morality.  
 
After all, moral philosophy differs from other domains like chess-playing and 
physiology in this aspect – the debate about how the claims that are made in moral 
philosophy can even be verified for their truth/falsity is still an ongoing investigation. 
It is still up in the air. For example, if one believes that moral claims are true/false 
depending on whether the moral claims correspond to some objective moral reality, it 
has yet to be shown how one can actually verify the correspondence of particular 
moral claims to moral reality.  
 
In other words, it is not yet clear how one can differentiate between people who are 
“correct” or “better” in their beliefs about the content of morality from those who are 
“not correct” or “worse” in their beliefs (whatever one’s conception of “correctness” in 
83	
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moral philosophy might be).  
 
As such, I do not think there are any experts yet in the content of morality per se, 
even though there are experts in the cut and thrust of logic and argumentation 
pertaining to morality. 
 
 
4.9 Overconfidence in trusting intuitive judgements and in explicating them 
 
Thus far in this dissertation, I have presented some empirical evidence from 
Daniel Kahneman’s work which suggest that the kind of intuition use in Foot, 
Thomson, and Kamm’s papers is problematic. The problem lies in that 
intuitions are the product of the cognitive mode known as fast thinking, and 
fast thinking is susceptible to systematic errors (biases), such as framing 
effects.  
 
There is, thus, some reason for moral philosophers to not be too confident about their 
intuitive judgements about particular cases. 
 
In addition to that, however, Kahneman also warns against being too confident in 
one’s ability to explicate intuitive judgements. 
 
When Alex Voorhoeve directly asks him, "What do you think of [Frances Kamm's] 
method of arriving at considered case judgements?" (Voorhoeve 2009: 73), this is 
what Kahneman says: 
 
“Well, there is a very interesting contrast between the way a 
psychologist would go at it and the way a philosopher would go at it, 
and it has a lot to do with the idea that the philosopher can know why 
she is reaching this conclusion. A basic assumption in psychological 
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analysis is that you first have an intuition in a given situation. Then, 
when you ask yourself why you have it, you tell yourself a story. But the 
story you come up with does not necessarily identify the cause of your 
intuitions, because you typically do not have access to what causes 
your intuitions. Moreover, in her work, Kamm seems to assume that the 
cause of her intuitive judgement is the recognition of something that 
counts as a reason. But this need not be true. ... So I would very sharply 
separate the different phases in Kamm's description of her method: the first 
phase, where she knows what she would do, and the second phase, in which 
she thinks deeply as to why she would do it and comes up with a reason. It is 
at least possible that the reason she comes up with was not the cause 
of her judgement” (Voorhoeve 2009: 74) [my emphases] 
 
 
Kahneman gives some empirical evidence to support what he says above. According 
to Kahneman: 
 
“There are experiments with post-hypnotic suggestion, where you tell 
somebody, 'I'll clap my hands and then you'll get up and open the window.' 
The person wakes up, you clap your hands, and he gets up and opens the 
window. If you ask him, 'Why did you open the window?' he'll say something 
like, 'The room felt very warm'. [But] you know why the subjects are doing it. 
They are doing it because they were given the instruction, and then 
somebody clapped his hands. But they have a completely different 
experience of why they are doing it. What's more, people are never at a 
loss for a reason why they did it. They can be made to do absolutely 
absurd things with post-hypnotic suggestion, and yet these things 
seem to make sense to them when they do them. The conclusion I draw 
from this is that the mental operation of making sense of our intuitive 
judgements ia very different cognitive activity from having these 
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intuitions. This takes us to the core of my disagreement with Frances 
Kamm. To me, her confidence is very much like the confidence of the 
hypnotic subject who claims he knows why he opened the window” 
(Voorhoeve 2009: 75). 
 
 
Given all the things that my dissertation has said so far about intuition use, the 
question that I find lies before me now is this:  
 
What might the proper role of intuition use be in moral philosophy?  
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CHAPTER 5: 
THE ROLE OF INTUITION USE IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (RECONSIDERED) 
 
5.1 A possible role for intuition use in moral philosophy 
 
What might the proper role of intuition use be, in moral philosophy? 
 
Daniel Kahneman, for all his research into the systematic errors that beset intuitive 
judgements, does not actually advocate completely ignoring moral intuitions. He says 
that “moral intuition about a specific case can neither be trusted nor altogether 
ignored” (Voorhoeve 2009: 78) [my emphasis]. 
 
For Kahneman, even though he “find[s] it hard to believe that the [Trolley, Transplant, 
and Bystander] cases differ in morally relevant ways”, he still thinks that “since the fat 
man scenario evokes an extraordinarily powerful intuition, you should not have a rule 
that ignores it”. By this, he means that “if anyone had a [moral] system that would 
condone pushing the bystander to save the five, then that system would not be 
viable, … would not be acceptable, [b]ecause pushing him is just deeply repugnant” 
(Voorhoeve 2009: 80). 
 
Kahneman thinks that what people end up doing is suppressing certain inconsistent 
moral intuitions, while playing up others. He explains it in this way: 
 
“ … our basic intuitions [such as about the Trolley and Transplant cases] 
are likely to contain contradictions that cannot be resolved … what we 
do then is construct systems that ultimately suppress some of these 
contradictory intuitions and build mostly on others. My expectation is 
that there is no uniquely reasonable way to do this, and that rhetoric, 
reigning cultural habits, and so on are going to play very important roles in 
determining how we do this. Part of the rhetorical success of a system stems 
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from its ability to sustain the conviction that comes from some of the basic 
intuitions and to generalise from those intuitions whilst drawing people's 
attention away from conflicting intuitions ... But it is clear to me that you 
can start with one set of intuitions or with another set, and that 
depending on where you start and on the rhetoric you employ, you are 
going to end up in a different place. In some sense, this makes the 
enterprise unending, because there is no unique solution” (Voorhoeve 2009: 
81, 83) [my emphases]. 
 
 
In my own view, I think there is a role for intuition use in moral philosophy. It is just 
that the role is a limited one. I have a suggestion regarding how moral intuitions could 
be used, and I will lay out my suggestion in this final chapter of the dissertation. 
  
A hint of the role which intuition use may possibly inhabit is actually found in 
something that Frances Kamm said, during her interview with Alex Voorhoeve. Kamm 
said: 
 
I think we don't really understand what believing in a principle amounts 
to until we consider various cases to which it might apply (Voorhoeve 
2009: 25) [my emphases]. 
 
In my view, there may be value in moral philosophers examining particular cases and 
forming intuitive judgements about what's (im)permissible to do in those cases. 
Here's why: suppose a moral philosopher has a putative moral principle that she 
favours. Suppose she thinks that the principle is a good one: perhaps she thinks the 
principle is something that could actually be used to guide or to evaluate human 
action. My suggestion here is this: the moral philosopher could try applying her 
favoured moral principle to a variety of cases (be they real or hypothetical ones), in 
order to test the extent of her own commitment to the principle. She could check to 
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see whether the moral conclusions generated by her principle are in sync with her 
intuitive judgements about the same cases. The philosopher then thinks about what 
she may be more willing to give up: either her favoured principle, or some of her 
intuitive judgements. I am saying that this exercise -- this brand of intuition use -- 
could be helpful as a gauge of how committed (or not committed) a philosopher is to 
to a putative moral principle. 
 
In addition to being used by a philosopher on herself, this way of involving intuitions in 
moral philosophy could also be used on others. So, for example, in order to gauge 
the extent of other philosophers' commitment to their favoured principles, their 
favoured principles could be put through a similar exercise. Sometimes, other people 
may not realise the true extent of their commitment to a principle (whether that extent 
be large or small), until they see that their principle's conclusions match or do not 
match their intuitive case judgements. 
 
In my view, if moral intuitions were to be given this limited role in moral philosophy, 
then this may go towards serving at least the following purposes: 
 
• In the interest of engaging with moral disagreement amongst 
different groups of people, and trying to find a reasonable way 
out of such disagreement, this brand of intuition use may enable 
people to eventually loosen their commitment to principles or 
particular case judgements. This may be key to resolving moral 
disagreements where the parties involved have conflicting brute 
moral judgements. 
 
• In the interest of pursuing moral truth or knowledge, 
philosophers would not be using something that is susceptible to 
systematic error (namely, moral intuitions) in a way that necessarily 
makes or breaks their moral theories. Philosophers would instead be 
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using moral intuitions as a test of their commitment (or other people's 
commitment) to moral principles. 
 
At any rate, I hope by now to have done the following things, which in the Introduction 
I said I set out to do: 
• understood what "moral intuitions" are, as they are used in Foot, Thomson, 
and Kamm's papers 
• presented some problems with using moral intuitions in the way that Foot, 
Thomson, and Kamm do, using Daniel Kahneman's empirical findings about 
intuitive judgements, 
• and made a small suggestion about what role moral intuitions could play in 
moral philosophy, given what I have presented about them. 
 
With that, I end this dissertation. 
 
END OF DISSERTATION 
